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Abstract 
Using listed companies with a presence of shares reduction 
of senior executives after the split share structure reform 
as research objects, we systematically study whether there 
are changes in earnings management behavior of senior 
executives’ shares reduction, as well as the relationship 
between the shares reduction degree and earnings 
management degree. Our analysis reveals that companies 
with a presence of shares reduction of senior executives 
have significantly positive controls over accounting 
earnings in the years of 2008 and 2009. However, there 
is no significant correlation between the level of earnings 
management of listed companies in China and the scale of 
shares reduction of senior executives. 
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INTRODUCTION
In the context of split share structure reform, senior 
executives set off a wave of shares reduction. Some 
industry insiders believe that, reducing profits of the 
previous year of the ban lifting, increasing the sales cost, 
and manipulating earnings are preparations for senior 
executives’ shares reduction, and also necessary work for 
many actual controllers of the listed company to smoothly 
reduce shares. Simultaneously, senior executives can 
control earnings management for maximum profits via 
advantaged information. However, there is no empirical 
research that addresses the relationship between senior 
executives’ shares reduction and the manipulative 
behavior of earnings management. Our research is an 
attempt to fill this research gap. 
1.  LITERATURE REVIEW
Currently, research on earnings management mainly 
focuses on the influence of accounting policies on the 
capital market. A significant part of literatures show 
three categories of research motivation on earnings 
management: capital market motivation, contract 
motivation, and political cost motivation. 
Investigating the relationship between shares reduction 
and earnings management, Beneish (1999) found that 
when earnings are overvalued, some managing personnel 
are more likely to sell their shares of the company to 
monetize. Park and Park (2004) discovered that if senior 
executives plan to sell the stocks at a later stage, the 
discretionary accruals may be adjusted to report the higher 
current accounting earnings. Cheng and Warfiled (2005) 
found with the higher portion of shares, the managing 
personnel may have bigger possibility of selling their 
stocks; meanwhile, for the published earnings there is 
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a bigger possibility of complying or slightly exceeding 
the profits predicted by analysts. McVay, Nagar, and 
Tang (2006) found that compared to enterprises failing 
to realize expected earnings, in enterprises with earnings 
over the estimated level, the managing personnel are more 
likely to reduce their shares. Senior executives would sell 
their stocks when earnings were adjusted to a higher value 
(Beneish, 1999). In contrast, after a number of paired 
studies, senior executives of the defaulting companies 
would sell their stocks before earnings were adjusted 
to a higher value (Beneish & Vargus, 2002). Moreover, 
Bar-Gill and Bebchuk (2002) and Bolton et al. (2002) 
concluded that senior executives had motives increase 
earnings before selling their stocks.
Studies in China mainly emphasize on earnings 
management in non-reduction shares. Cai and Wei (2008) 
show that discretionary accruals are significantly positive 
and the level of earnings management is positively 
correlated to the market performance of the company 
shares in the corresponding period. This study shows that 
every company may have share-reduction-aimed earnings 
management. Li and Liu (2009) discover that after the 
split share structure reform, listed companies dramatically 
enhanced forward earnings management. Also, compared 
to companies without share reduction, listed companies 
showed significant forward earnings management in four 
fiscal years before big or small non-reduction shares. 
Jiang (2010) reveals that compared to the industrial 
average level, sample companies with the implementing 
o f  non- t r adab le  sha re  r educ t ion  had  ea rn ings 
management in the share reduction year. Meanwhile, 
both flow ability and speculative motives possibly lead 
to earnings management. The greater the motives are, 
the more significant the earnings management would 
be. Besides, the quantity and market value of reduced 
shares are positively correlated to the level of earnings 
management, which shows the larger quantity and the 
higher market value of reduced shares lead to easier 
earnings management.
2.  HYPOTHESIS 
Inside analysts believe that listed companies have three 
motives to reduce the senior executives’ shares. First 
and foremost, to cash out―it would be secure to have 
investment returned. Second, to buy or sell the company 
stocks before good or bad news are publicized in order 
to gain higher profits. Third, some listed companies 
intentionally reduce or increase the senior executives’ 
shares to affect the stock price for special purposes. As a 
result, without considering debt defaults, senior executives 
with company shares will plan to sell their shares at a 
premeditated time and to manage earnings as well as raise 
the share price for their own benefits. Simultaneously, the 
larger is the scale of the planned reduction, the greater 
is the motive for earnings management. Accordingly, 
relative earnings management shall be an upward 
manipulation and aim at raising the share price (Rangan, 
1998; Erickson & Wang, 1999). Meanwhile, the higher 
cash withdrawal amount implies the greater profits can be 
gained from reducing shares, which shows the existence 
of deliberate manipulation of the surplus to raise the share 
price. So, it can be considered that company earnings are 
controlled with greater degree before share reduction. To 
coordinate with share reduction, some listed companies 
may guide the value judgments of investors via diverse 
manners, including the upward manipulation of earnings 
management before share reduction.
Therefore, hypotheses are put forward as below:
H1: Companies with share reduction plan by senior 
executives tend to carry out upward manipulation of earnings 
management for smooth share reduction next year.
H2: In companies with share reduction implement 
by senior executives, the level of earnings management 
is positively correlated to that of the share reduction of 
senior executives.
3.  STUDY DESIGN
3.1  Date Sources
Pairing of companies of A-share listed companies with 
and without share reduction in Shanghai and Shenzhen 
from 2008 to 2010 are applied as objectives for the 
study. Listed finance and insurance companies, new 
listed companies, ST and ST* companies, and listed 
companies without financial statement or transaction 
information are picked out. This requires selecting 
paired companies based on industry, year and scale. 
After matching according to the year and the events 
of company share reduction, we sort out 168, 203 and 
147 sample companies from the years 2008, 2009, 
and 2010, respectively. The related data of share 
reduction are from the “Record of Credit-standing of 
Listed Companies—Price Fluctuation of Shares Held 
by Directors, Supervisors and Senior Executives” 
of  the Shanghai  Share Exchange and Shenzhen 
Share Exchange. Financial statement and transaction 
information are obtained from the database of China 
Share Market & Accounting Research (CSMAR). 
3.2  Evaluating Model
A model below is established to evaluate the hypothesis:
1 2 3 4 5 6* * * * *i i i i i i iDA TRANSACTION LEV SIZE CFO ROEα α α α α α ε= + + + + + +
1 2 3 4 5 6* * * * *i i i i i i iDA TRANSACTION LEV SIZE CFO ROEα α α α α α ε= + + + + + +
a. Dependent Variable
DAi is discretionary accruals during share reduction 
of Company i. Referred from Cai and Wei (2008), 
the revised Jones Model is applied to separate non-
discretionary accruals and discretionary accruals. 
Discretionary accruals can measure the degree of 
earnings management.
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b. Explanatory Variable
To evaluate if there exists ab upward manipulation of 
earnings management with the purpose of share reduction 
in Hypothesis 1, a binary variable is take to describe 
whether the senior executives reduce their shares, if yes, 
TRANSACTION is 1, and if not, TRANSACTION is 0. 
To evaluate whether higher market value of reduced 
shares leads to greater degree of earnings management 
in Hypothesis 2, we refer to the measurement of the 
reduction scale by Cai and Wei (2009). We established an 
index TRANSACTION =(transaction quantity * price)/ 
the initial total asset. If share reduction occurs repeatedly 
during the years from T0 and T1, then TRANSACTION 
will be the sum of transaction scales of all reductions, and 
such transactions can be considered as being influenced 
by the same annual financial report. In the light of studies 
of Park and Park (2004), the transaction quantity is the 
total number of actually reduced shares and transaction 
price is the reduction price. 
c. Control Variables
LEV is the financial lever in T0 of the company, as 
measured by the result of gross debts divided by total 
assets, to restrain the influence of debts on earnings 
management (DeFond & Jiambalvo, 1994). SIZE refers to 
the scale of T0, measured by the natural logarithm of total 
assets, to control the influence of external supervision 
caused by firm size on earnings management (Dechow & 
Dichev, 2002). CFO indicates the net cash flow resulted 
from the operating activities of the company in T0, 
standardized by beginning total assets. ROE is the net 
asset ratio in T0, measured by the result of year-end net 
profits divided by year-end net assets.
4.  RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
4.1  Descriptive Statistics
From 2008 to 2010, a descriptive statistical study was 
made on the DA and Transaction of sample companies 
with the implementation of senior executives’ share 
reduction as well as the DA of the pairing companies 
without the implementation of senior executives’ share 
reduction. The resulting descriptive statistics is shown in 
Table 1:
Table 1 
A Descriptive Statistical Study on DA and Transaction From 2008 to 2010
Variable Group Number of samples Max. Min. Average
DA08
Sample companies 168 1.0120 -0.3672 0.0973 
Pairing companies 168 1.119 -0.320 0.038 
DA09
Sample companies 203 0.7914 -0.6004 0.0292 
Pairing companies 203 0.326 -0.239 0.012 
DA10
Sample companies 147 0.9052 -0.7444 -0.0081 
Pairing companies 147 1.4107 -0.949 -0.0168
Transaction08 Sample companies 168 0.0790 0.0000 0.0015
Transaction09 Sample companies 203 0.1777 0.0000 0.0035
Transaction2010 Sample companies 147 0.1320 0.0000 0.0056
Note: Market Value of Reduced Shares = (Reduced Quantity*Price)/Beginning Assets
Table 1 shows the maximum DA of the sample 
companies in the three years with a decrease first and then 
an increase. The sample includes the highest point in 2008 
and the lowest one in 2009. Meanwhile, comparing to the 
pairing companies without share reduction, the indicator 
also demonstrates a trend from decrease to increase. 
Based on the average DA, the companies with share 
reduction also decrease year by year to a negative value 
till 2010; and the pairing companies decrease in the same 
way, thereby reaching a negative value in 2010. However, 
as for the average, the companies with share reduction is 
greater than that of the pairing companies without share 
reduction in the three years. For the market value of 
the reduced shares, the minimum of the three years was 
0.0000, because the reduction quantity is much smaller 
compared to the beginning assets.
4.2.  An Empirical Test of Hypothesis I
Table 2 indicates the regression results of the model 
of Hypothesis I.  In 2008, the reduction variable 
TRANSACTION and cash flow in operating activities 
(CFO) are significant at 1%; asset size (SIZE) and asset-
liability ratio (LEV) are significant at 5%; but the return 
on equity (ROE) is not significant. While in 2009, ROE 
is significant at 1%; SIZE and LEV are significant at 5%; 
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TRANSACTION significance test at 10%; but CFO did 
not pass the test. However in 2010, ROE and CFO passed 
the significance test at 1%, TRANSACTION, SIZE and 
LEV did not, without an obvious relation to each other.
Table 2 
Regression Results of Hypothesis I
Variable 2008 2009 2010
Constant
-0.317 * -0.179 -0.404 
(-1.786) (-1.542) (-0.666)
Transaction
0.062 *** 0.013* -0.056 
(3.642) （1.613） ('-0.954) 
SIZE
0.019 ** 0.01* 0.017 
（2.311） (1.828) (0.572) 
LEV
-0.099 ** -0.072* -0.034 
(-2.225) (-2.237) (0.647)
ROE
0.009 0.114*** 0.245***
(0.594) (2.785) (4.683) 
CFO
-0.179 *** -0.006 -0.132 ***
(-4.711) (-1.105) (-3.849) 
Adjustable R^2 0.101 0.041 0.027
F Value 8.319 8.319 6.989
Note: ***, ** and * indicate the statistical significance by 0.01, 0.05 and 
0.1 (two-tailed test) and the value in brackets is the value of t.
S t a t i s t i c s  p r e s e n t e d  a b o v e  r e v e a l  t h a t  t h e 
TRANSACTION and DA are obviously positively 
correlated in 2008 and 2009, which represents a significant 
upward manipulation of earnings management in the 
companies with share reduction (when TRANSACTION 
=1). Meanwhile, in the two years, the SIZE and LEV 
were also correlated. However in 2010, none of the 
TRANSACTON, SIZE or LEV passed the test and 
showed an unobvious correlation, which indicates that 
share reduction did not have any influence on earnings 
management in the year.
4.3.  An Empirical Test of Hypothesis II
Table 3 shows the regression results of Hypothesis II. 
In 2008, LEV passed the significance test at 1%; SIZE 
passed the significance test at 5%; CFO passed the 
significance test at 10%, but neither TRANSACTION 
nor ROE passed. In 2009, SIZE passed the significance 
test at 5%; LEV passed the significance test at 10%; but 
none of TRANSACTION, CFO or ROE passed the test. 
In 2010, CFO and ROE passed the significance test at 
10%, but none of the TRANSACTION, LEV or SIZE 
passed the test. 
The results suggest that in 2008, 2009 and 2010, the 
TRANSACTION and DA are not correlated obviously. 
In 2008 and 2009, the SIZE and LEV are correlated to 
earnings management in different levels; and no results 
were found about the correlation between CFO and ROE.
Table 3 
Regression Results of Hypothesis II
Variables 2008 2009 2010
Constant
-0.298 -0.314* 0.154
-1.365 -1.733 0.446
Transaction
0.092 -0.369 -0.127
1.475 -0.719 1.277
SIZE
0.022** 0.0167** 0.093
2.222 2.014 1.046
LEV
-0.189*** -0.053* -0.089
-3.585 -1.898 0.788
ROE
-0.002 0.093 0.106*
-1.072 1.375 1.653
CFO
-0.298* -0.039 -0.083*
-1.765 -0.555 1.745
Adjustable R^2 0.074 0.021 0.023
F Value 5.319 3.763 3.329
Note: ***, ** and * indicate the statistical significance by 0.01, 0.05 and 
0.1 (two-tailed test) and the value in brackets is the value of t.
CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTION
A multiple linear regression model was built based on 
the listed companies with the implementation of share 
reduction of senior executives at Shanghai Stock Exchange 
and Shenzhen Stock Exchange before December 2010. 
The purpose of model was to study the relation between 
earnings management and whether there is share reduction 
as well as the reduction level. We find that, from 2008 to 
2009, companies with senior executives’ share reduction 
have made a significant upward manipulation of earnings 
management on the earnings report, but the reduction 
size and the earnings management level are not obviously 
correlated. As for earnings management problems 
resulted from the salary, share encouragement and share 
reduction in Chinese listed companies, we suggest 
enhanced supervision and control over the share reduction 
of managing personnel in listed companies, so as to 
make the share reduction clear to the public, and prevent 
stockholders from acquiring extra profits and impairing 
the medium and small stockholders’ interests via insider 
trading. At the same time, capital gains tax shall be 
collected from the senior executives with arbitrage acts to 
ensure the fairness of secondary distribution and stabilize 
the market. Also, accounting policies should be improved 
to restrain earnings management acts in listed companies. 
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